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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Prosecutor’s Prejudicial Misconduct During
Closing Argument Was Objectively Unreasonable and Prejudiced Mr. Andrus
In closing argument, the prosecutor shared her opinion that Mr. Andrus was the “best”

manipulator she had “ever seen” and that he was trying to manipulate the jurors, cautioning:
“Don’t be manipulated. . . find the defendant guilty.” Trial Tr. p. 590, ln. 20 - p. 591, ln. 6. It was
objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to fail to object to the prosecutor’s argument. This
deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Andrus because an objection would have changed the
trial’s result and the misconduct deprived Mr. Andrus of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The
district court erred in denying Mr. Andrus’ petition.
In response, the state asserts the prosecutor’s inflammatory comments did not constitute
misconduct because her opinion regarding Mr. Andrus’s manipulative ability was supported by
evidence that he had been untruthful. Respondent’s Brief, p. 7-15. However, prosecutors should
refrain from including personal opinions and beliefs about a witness’s credibility and should not
employ inflammatory words to describe the defendant. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d
477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).
It may be improper to label the defendant as a “liar” for testimony given in his defense and, even
when the defendant admitted to lying in connection with the case, excessive labeling of the
defendant as a “liar” could be viewed as an improper attempt to obtain a guilty verdict by
disparaging the defendant before the jury. See Gross, 146 Idaho at 19, 189 P.3d at 481.
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Here, the prosecutor went beyond permissible argument that Mr. Andrus’ testimony was
not credible and: (1) repeatedly disparaged Mr. Andrus by using the terms manipulate and
manipulator; (2) advised the jury of her personal opinion that Mr. Andrus was the “best”
manipulator she had seen; and (3) warned the jury it would fall victim of Mr. Andrus’
manipulation unless it returned a guilty verdict. Tr. p. 590, ln. 20 - p. 591, ln. 6. A“liar” is simply
“a person who tells lies” whereas a “manipulator” is an “exploiter” who controls or influences
“in a clever or conniving way.” The prosecutor’s claim that Mr. Andrus was a very skilled
manipulator manipulating the jury can only be viewed as an inflammatory tactic and was
impermissible. See also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588.
The state also notes that in Mr. Andrus’ opening brief, he cites the prosecutor’s argument
that Mr. Andrus “hasn’t told the truth to anyone, anyone, and his story changes whenever it is
convenient for him.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 9, n.4; Trial Tr. p. 576. The state argues that Mr.
Andrus “waived” an argument that this comment was misconduct because post-conviction
counsel indicated that the statement alone was not sufficiently egregious to warrant a mistrial. Id.
However, prosecutorial conduct must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009). The prosecutor’s statements during her
closing argument, as well as her rebuttal argument, are part of the relevant record.
The prosecutor’s argument went well beyond communicating that Mr. Andrus’ testimony
was implausible or lacked credibility and, instead, claimed that Mr. Andrus was a conman
attempting to trick the jury and that an acquittal would mean they had fallen victim to his
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scheme. Such an appeal to the jury’s emotion during closing argument was plainly improper and
counsel was deficient in failing to object.
No one witnessed Mr. Andrus drinking or driving and and whether the jury concluded
that he drove under the influence was highly dependent on whether the jury believed his
testimony. In such a case, the prosecutor’s personal opinion that Mr. Andrus was one of the most
manipulative criminals she had encountered and that his trial defense constituted his latest con
was particularly harmful. Mr. Andrus proved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and
the district court erred in denying Mr. Andrus petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

Counsel’s Failure to Timely Convey the Plea Offer and His Failure to File a Motion
in Limine to Exclude the Breath Test Results and the Widmark Equation Were
Objectively Unreasonable and Prejudiced Mr. Andrus
As explained in Mr. Andrus’ opening brief, it was objectively unreasonable for trial

counsel to fail to review the state’s misdemeanor offer before it was revoked two days later. Had
counsel timely reviewed the offer, Mr. Andrus would have taken his advice to accept it and been
permitted to resolve the case as a misdemeanor. Additionally, Mr. Andrus argued that if trial
counsel had moved to exclude evidence of the BAC and of the Widmark equation, those motions
should have been granted and, had the jury not heard this evidence, there if a reasonable
probability the jury would not have found Mr. Andrus guilty of driving under the influence.
Mr. Andrus’ opening brief adequately addresses the state’s responsive arguments as to
these issues. Accordingly, no additional reply is required.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Andrus’ opening brief, the district court
erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief and this Court should reverse the final
judgment and remand with instruction that (i) Mr. Andrus’ judgment of conviction be vacated
and/or (ii) that he be given the opportunity to accept the state's initial plea offer.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of January 2021
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